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HAIL MARRIAGE AND FAREWELL 
Ethan J. Leib* 
 
It was elating to see the long-awaited victory for same-sex marriage pop 
up on my screen at 10:01 a.m. on June 26, 2015.  It felt like a victory for 
rights, for open-mindedness, for love, and for the future.  It was gratifying 
to see something I wasn’t sure I would get to see in my lifetime.  I felt for a 
moment that I was living in a modern liberal state, where the state doesn’t 
get in the business of making moral judgments about people’s intimate 
choices in how they choose to organize their romantic and sexual lives. 
But it didn’t take long reading the opinion to see something many in the 
LGBT community warned people about along the way to marriage equality:  
that the price of admission to marriage for same-sex couples was the further 
reinforcement of a very traditional understanding of marriage and its role in 
society.1  Justice Kennedy’s decision for the majority in Obergefell v. 
Hodges2 is nothing if not a paean to a very traditional picture of marriage 
and its centrality in the social order.3  That may have been the cost of his 
vote:  to get a conservative to sign onto same-sex marriage, perhaps we 
needed a conservative vision of romantic and sexual life in marriage.  And 
maybe it was worth it, too; indeed, the two unmarried and one widowed 
women on the Court signed onto the opinion with nary a concurring or 
cautionary note.  Costs aside, if we are going to have marriage at all, we 
can’t have marriage that excludes same-sex couples. 
Still, there is an important question that likely remains open after 
Obergefell.  Although no one can doubt that same-sex couples now have a 
fundamental right to marry if and when the state offers marriage at all, one 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Thanks to Mary Anne Case, Clare 
Huntington, Joseph Landau, Juliet Lapidos, Evan Lee, Tom Lee, Michael Serota, Jed 
Shugerman, Steve Thel, Ben Zipursky, Catherine Powell, and participants in a summer 
Supreme Court workshop at Fordham University School of Law for conversations about this 
piece.  I first explored the ideas presented here in an op-ed, Ethan J. Leib, Opinion, Down 
with Marriage, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2015, at A23, and have sought to make a similar 
argument here in a longer format.  Thank you to Lea Yoon for help with research and 
substance.  Thank you to Sarah Jaramillo for help with sources. 
 
 1. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 3. See id. at 2593–94 (“From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of 
human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. . . .  Rising from the most 
basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”); id. 
at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of 
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.  In forming a marital union, two people 
become something greater than once they were.”). 
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might wonder whether Justice Kennedy actually created not just a right to 
marry, but also a right to marriage itself.4  To wit, is it an outgrowth of the 
Court’s opinion that there is a constitutional requirement that states provide 
marriage and issue licenses?  May states look for ways to pull themselves 
away from endorsing marriage at all? 
My conclusion in what follows is that, notwithstanding much rhetoric in 
the opinion, states have some room to rethink marriage in light of marriage 
equality.  And with some intellectual jujitsu, this opening to rethink the 
state’s place in relational ordering gives marriage-skeptics another bite at 
the apple to get something they wanted all along:  to decenter the largely 
religious, gendered, and bourgeois institution of marriage.5  Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion has the unfortunate result of reaffirming marriage at the 
top of a relational hierarchy, yet there are surely other ways we can have 
civil rights and equality for gay people without marriage at all.  A little bit 
of resistance by several states might allow for movement toward an even 
more progressive vision of a life in love.  That vision either proliferates the 
menu of options available to people—gay or straight—or makes a 
meaningful effort to secularize the primary modality of recognizing and 
legitimating the private choices people make about ordering their romantic 
and sexual lives.  Ultimately, this kind of disestablishment is not some 
newfangled idea:  the state actually was quite a latecomer into the marriage 
business and it is only contingently in its current role.6 
 
*     *     * 
 
Justice Kennedy certainly skates very close to establishing a right to 
marriage, not merely a right of access for same-sex couples to marry where 
and when marriage exists.  Indeed, he had a lot to work with, using the 
Court’s own precedent.  A recent count by the American Foundation for 
Equal Rights—the organization that fought California’s Proposition 8 in the 
courts, leading to the 2013 Hollingsworth v. Perry7 decision8—found at 
 
 4. Some commentators saw that the slippage between the right to marry and the right to 
marriage long before Obergefell provided reason to revisit the question. See, e.g., Martha C. 
Nussbaum, A Right to Marry, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 685–89 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2096–97 (2005). 
 5. See, e.g., TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT:  MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE 
FOR THEIR DIVORCE 1–18 (2010); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) 
MARRIAGE:  VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 32–33 (2008); Katherine M. Franke, 
Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008) (“[E]fforts to secure marriage 
equality for same-sex couples must be undertaken, at a minimum, in a way that is compatible 
with efforts to dislodge marriage from its normatively superior status as compared with other 
forms of human attachment, commitment, and desire.  Resisting the normative and epistemic 
frame that values nonmarital forms of life in direct proportion to their similarity to marriage, 
we must unseat marriage as the measure of all things.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1766 (2005) 
(citing GEORGE ELLIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904)); id. at 
1794–95 (contrasting Puritan New England’s late entry into marriage licensure to the long 
Anglo-American history of conflation “between religious and civil marriage”). 
 7. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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least fourteen Supreme Court cases since 1888 that advert to or support the 
general idea of marriage as a fundamental right.9  Those cases provided 
building blocks for the portion of the Obergefell decision that relies on the 
Due Process Clause to reinforce why states may not ban same-sex 
marriage.10  Although a Court decision based solely on the Equal Protection 
Clause was possible, the decision Justice Kennedy actually wrote was a 
mixture of equality-talk rooted in equal protection jurisprudence and 
fundamental rights-talk rooted in the Due Process Clause.11  Still, as I read 
it, the Court ultimately comes shy of establishing that states have a 
constitutional obligation to provide some package of relational privileges 
and burdens called marriage, which is another way to understand what it 
would really mean for each individual to have a fundamental right to 
marriage. 
Consider this hypothetical.  Imagine the federal government and all of 
the states decide all at once on a creative solution to the culture war 
surrounding same-sex marriage that is likely to continue for a few months 
or years after Obergefell.  The détente is an agreement that marriage in 
America will be left wholly to the private sphere and that only “civil 
unions” will be made available to all couples—opposite- or same-sex.  
Under this plan, civil unions would be the only domestic arrangement the 
state would recognize to disburse benefits to families, to exact taxes upon 
families, and to administer its family law. 
True enough, this “solution” doesn’t wholly dignify the claims of single 
people who think the state should not be setting up systems to encourage 
coupling with the effect of denigrating the perfectly dignified lives of those 
who live as singles,12 nor does it address those who might seek legal 
recognition for polyamorous unions.13  But it disestablishes marriage in a 
way that could be useful to both sides in the culture wars:  those who want 
 
 8. Id. at 2668 (overturning the Proposition 8 ballot initiative banning same-sex 
marriage in California). 
 9. 14 Supreme Court Cases:  Marriage Is a Fundamental Right, AM. FOUND. FOR 
EQUAL RIGHTS (July 19, 2012), http://www.afer.org/blog/14-supreme-court-cases-marriage-
is-a-fundamental-right/ (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 
(1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Moore v. E. 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–
40 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 383 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); 
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888)) [http://perma.cc/3LWS-CJH2]. 
 10. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
 11. For some discussion of why it might have been better for the Court to stick with a 
more pure equal protection analysis, see Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism:  
Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015). 
 12. See BELLA DEPAULO, SINGLED OUT:  HOW SINGLES ARE STEREOTYPED, 
STIGMATIZED, AND IGNORED, AND STILL LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFTER 2–5 (2006); Michael 
Cobb, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-courts-lonely-hearts-
club.html?ref=opinion&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/NSX3-F67Z]. 
 13. See generally RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE (2015). 
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to associate with a church that has some exclusive definition of marriage 
can have their way (a church that will not marry gays or a synagogue that 
will not marry Jews to non-Jews) and those who want the state to treat all-
comers equally in their requests for state recognition of partnership could 
have their way too.  The “solution” also helps the state unload the millennia 
of baggage associated with marriage.  Many feminists are right to highlight 
that marriage has been a source of women’s oppression; many secularists 
are right to highlight marriage’s religious character and the way the state 
unduly and unnecessarily entangles itself in religious practice by licensing 
marriages; and many sensitive to the way marriage stratifies society are 
right to emphasize that marriage is a bourgeois institution that is both out of 
reach for many poor people and that reinforces a certain kind of consumer 
capitalism that is distasteful.14  It is better for the state to opt out and 
distribute benefits and taxes in a more neutral way in the public sphere. 
Would this possible world offend the U.S. Constitution?  Surely, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion provides an odd quotation here and there to support that 
position.15  But it is exceedingly difficult to see how that could be true, and 
not only for reasons Justice Thomas alludes to in his dissent:  that most of 
our constitutional rights are negative rather than positive rights.16  It is hard 
to believe there is one bundle of privileges and burdens, itself given only 
one name—marriage—that states must provide.  Indeed, there is plenty of 
diversity among states in what they actually do provide, and there is no 
corpus of constitutional law indicating the constitutional metes and bounds 
of what the marital minimum for states is.  We know the state can’t set up 
“separate but equal” institutions—giving same-sex couples civil unions and 
opposite-sex couples the thing called marriage—but that doesn’t give us 
any clarity on the question at hand.  It is true that a cleaner equal protection 
analysis in Obergefell would probably have done more to foreclose the 
argument that states must provide marriage, so this remains a real question.  
But the best answer seems to be that if all states decided all at once to get 
rid of marriage tomorrow in favor of civil unions for all, there is no 
constitutional injury that is likely to follow.17 
 
*     *     * 
 
But let’s move from the hypothetical world back to the almost-real 
world.  Imagine that this “civil union for all” solution is tried not 
nationwide, but is started first in a state called Alahoma or Oklatucky.  
 
 14. See generally sources cited supra note 5. 
 15. E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2599 (“Like choices concerning contraception, family 
relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, 
decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make.”). 
 16. Id. at 2635–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 17. I follow Martha Nussbaum here:  “Nowhere . . . has the Court held that a state must 
offer the expressive benefits of marriage.  There appears to be no constitutional barrier to a 
decision of a state to get out of the expressive game altogether, going over to a regime of 
civil unions . . . .” Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 688.  Although she was writing before 
Obergefell, Obergefell is not a game-changer here. 
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Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky seems to be urging that his state get out of 
the marriage business.18  And Alabama and Oklahoma each got bills 
through one of their legislative houses in the run up to Obergefell that at 
least started the process of reconsidering the state’s entanglement with 
marriage.19  If just one or two states try this mode of détente, is there a 
constitutional injury that could be contemplated by same-sex or opposite-
sex couples? 
Although I have suggested that there is no general right to have marriage 
recognition from “the state” if such recognition is offered to no one, if a 
state like Alahoma embraces this détente not to quell the culture war but to 
stoke it, perhaps the intent of such legislation is so clearly meant to 
denigrate same-sex couples that some theory of constitutional injury is 
plausible for such couples.  However, that would be a strange way of 
thinking about the constitutional law of marriage:  a facially neutral policy 
of disestablishment that has the same impact on all members of the polity 
equally would be unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples because 
of an invidious intent, but not as applied to opposite-sex couples, who 
cannot claim that the policy was adopted to discriminate against them.  
Even if it were possible for same-sex couples to challenge a state’s effort to 
get out of the marriage business (leaving only same-sex couples with a 
remedy of marriage, not opposite-sex couples), it would not be easy to 
show that such a state is doing so for constitutionally suspect reasons. 
There are many reasons why a state—even if acting alone—would 
consider getting out of the marriage business.  Some of those reasons are 
not just “benign” in the sense that they are not driven by malice or 
animus,20 but they are affirmatively rights-protecting.  States may be 
getting out of the marriage business (1) to promote religious associational 
rights in the private sphere where some wish to maintain traditional forms 
of marriage out of genuine religious beliefs; (2) to promote rights of gender 
equality in light of marriage’s long history of reinforcing gender roles; or 
(3) to promote a more contractarian and less religiously inflected coupling 
institution for the secular state.  Not only do none of these state purposes 
seem invidious, they all have serious constitutional dimensions of their own 
that could be seen in certain lights as vindicating underenforced 
constitutional norms. 
 
*     *     * 
 
 
 18. See Rand Paul, Government Should Get Out of the Marriage Business Altogether, 
TIME (June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939374/rand-paul-gay-marriage-supreme-court/ 
[http://perma.cc/4URY-ASCC]. 
 19. See S.B. 377, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015), https://legiscan.com/AL/text/ 
SB377/2015 [http://perma.cc/CC3J-JN33]; H.R. 1125, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015), 
https://legiscan.com/OK/text/HB1125/2015 [http://perma.cc/DAX3-3G3K].  Neither bill was 
passed into law. 
 20. Of course, “animus” can undermine state laws even under rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause according to the logic of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
633–34 (1996), an earlier Justice Kennedy opinion vindicating the civil rights of gay people. 
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Yet I confess the constitutional analysis here belies the atmospherics.  
Moving from the almost-real world to the actual world, what we saw 
happening in Oklahoma and Alabama right before Obergefell was not a 
careful debate about marriage’s future in light of what the Supreme Court 
was about to do.  There was fear and anxiety about the integration of the 
institution and a casting about for some way to resist what was about to 
happen.  Indeed, Oklahoma State Representative Republican Ted Russ, the 
author of the Oklahoma bill, acknowledged he was responding to the 
marriage equality movement and explained, “The point of my legislation is 
to take the state out of the process and leave marriage in the hands of the 
clergy.”21 
Although the most rash of approaches to détente offered by Oklahoma 
and Alabama did not come to pass, a plausible analogy could be made to 
the Southern states that thought it better to get rid of public pools and public 
schools altogether than to integrate them racially, as the federal government 
was requiring.  This “Massive Resistance” movement sought to stem the 
tide of civil rights being granted to blacks.22  A similar movement seemed 
to be bubbling up in some Southern states as the federal government was 
about to create a right to same-sex marriage:  better to have no marriage 
than to sully the institution by integrating it.  That analogy does not cast the 
right-wing proposals for getting out of the marriage business in a very 
favorable light, and history has judged Southern resistance to integration 
during the Civil Rights Revolution harshly—and deservedly so.  Should we 
judge pockets of resistance to integrating marriage with same-sex couples 
as harshly? 
 
*     *     * 
 
To be fair, neither Oklahoma nor Alabama passed their laws in 
anticipation of the ruling, and in the few weeks after the ruling there has 
been widespread compliance with the Court’s decision, even in states that 
looked like they were interested in resistance.23  But it would be premature 
 
 21. See Randy Ellis, House Passes Bill to Abolish Oklahoma Marriage Licenses, 
OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 10, 2015), http://newsok.com/house-passes-bill-to-abolish-oklahoma-
marriage-licenses/article/5400240 [http://perma.cc/SXA2-LTZY]. 
 22. For historical background on Massive Resistance, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE 
OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE:  RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S (1969); 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
175–88 (2007); GEORGE LEWIS, MASSIVE RESISTANCE:  THE WHITE RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1–26 (2006); MASSIVE RESISTANCE:  SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE 
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 21–38 (Clive Webb ed., 2005). 
 23. E.g., Associated Press, All Alabama Counties Complying with Gay Marriage Ruling, 
LGBT Groups Report, AL.COM (July 2, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2015/07/all_alabama_counties_complying.html [http://perma.cc/7SSS-GRG9].  
Some counties in Alabama, however, are not issuing any marriage licenses, claiming state 
law gives them discretion to issue no licenses—even though there is widespread 
understanding that if judges issue licenses to opposite-sex couples, they must issue them to 
same-sex couples as well. See Associated Press, Alabama Judges Must Issue Gay Marriage 
Licenses if They Issue Straight Marriage Licenses, Court Rules, AL.COM (July 2, 2015), 
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to condemn a state’s possible withdrawal from the marriage business, 
especially if that withdrawal were preceded by a meaningful deliberative 
process about the best way forward after the Court’s imposition of marriage 
equality. 
Ultimately, I am doubtful that this potential form of resistance to the 
Obergefell decision would be on the wrong side of history.  To go a bit 
further, LGBT advocates fresh from their recent victory might do well to 
join with those on the Right looking to get their states to recede from the 
marriage business.  Now that the stain of indignity and inequality has been 
removed in this domain, it may be time to think more progressively about 
the future of marriage. 
What some marriage-skeptics within the LGBT community wanted to 
achieve even before the gay rights movement double-downed on the quest 
toward marriage equality was a true separation of church and state, in which 
the government would only recognize secular unions, free of gender scripts 
and the normativity of bourgeois domesticity.24  For this group of thinkers, 
although marriage equality was a no-brainer if the state was going to have 
marriage at all, there was real suspicion even of an ultimately integrated 
version of the institution.  To “queer” family life, the plan requires more 
than domesticating same-sex couples into the religious, gendered, and 
bourgeois institution.  Even if the inclusion of queer families into the 
traditional institution would serve to mix things up helpfully, the left wing 
of the LGBT community understood that it was plausible to hope for less 
normativity from the state about how to order family life.25 
Several different strategies could move us closer to that outcome:  (1) 
disestablishing all marriage and opting only for the “civil unions for all” 
solution as a public law matter;26 (2) including a wider array of state 
options for familial organization without privileging one over another, so 
that couples could sign registries or contracts or unions or marriages and all 
get the same default treatment, whatever they choose; or (3) even more 
radically rethinking all family law to get the state to further recede from the 
bedroom and the home.  Because option (3) has the most potential to leave 
vulnerable persons subject to predation in the private sphere, probably 
implicates gender equality itself because it leaves the state impotent to 
intervene when necessary, and is the hardest to envision how to implement, 
 
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/07/alabama_judges_must_issue_gay.html 
[http://perma.cc/6J46-AMMV].  More recently, Kentucky county clerk Kim Davis declined 
to issue a marriage license despite the Court’s rejection of her request for a delay. See Alan 
Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Defies Justices on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2015, at A1. 
 24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5. 
 25. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL:  SEX, POLITICS, AND THE 
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 7–9 (2000). 
 26. One might include in this option the various proposals for a singular “intimate 
caregiver” status and a “friend registry” as well. See sources cited supra note 5.  For more on 
distributing the benefits and burdens of family status based on care-giving relationships 
rather than the traditional marital or biological family, see DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. 
COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH:  CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
FAMILY TIES (2009). 
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options (1) and (2) seem more attractive and achievable in the medium 
term.  In an ironic turn, the states that see themselves as interested in 
resisting marriage equality are at least opening a pathway toward option 
(1)—and it may be valuable for the marriage-skeptics in the LGBT 
community and elsewhere to work with legislators in Alabama and 
Oklahoma to bring them closer to their goals, whether by refining option (1) 
or helping those legislatures understand option (2).  Marriage-skeptics 
didn’t quite foresee that it might just take the marriage equality win to start 
working with the other side to disestablish marriage. 
 
*     *     * 
 
It is worth taking a slightly closer look at what Alabama and Oklahoma 
proposed before Obergefell to help identify just how these plans could be 
tweaked to make both the religious objectors to same-sex marriage and the 
left wing LGBT community work together for a mutually advantageous 
outcome. 
Alabama’s proposal is the somewhat more progressive approach.  Four 
Republicans and one Democrat sponsored the bill; three other Democrats 
ultimately voted in its favor.27  Although Senate Bill 377 did not actually 
purport to get rid of the status of marriage, it did secularize it by 
prospectively recognizing only “contracts of marriage”28 that could be 
entered into by any two persons “who are otherwise legally authorized to be 
married.”29  After Obergefell, that would have included same-sex 
contractors in Alabama.  Ultimately, very little about Alabama’s family law 
was going to change:  there were going to be couples “recorded” as 
“married” in Alabama’s law.  But Alabama was going to make small 
changes, none of which were obviously retrogressive; they might even be 
thought to be on a progressive path. 
Most importantly, Alabama was no longer going to be in the business of 
issuing marriage licenses, preferring instead for couples simply to present a 
contract signed by witnesses to a probate court to be considered married 
under law.  The contract was going to serve as the record of the marriage, 
and the state requirement of a license to marry was going to be abolished.  
Although largely a change in nomenclature rather than a thorough and 
substantive revisiting of the state’s entanglement in marriage, even as an 
expressive shift in emphasis, there is much to recommend the approach.  By 
distancing the state from endorsing the sacredness of the marriage bond and 
emphasizing its civil nature, Alabama was planning to open the door to a 
 
 27. S.B. 377, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015), https://legiscan.com/AL/rollcall/SB377/ 
id/447983 [http://perma.cc/H8B3-AW9B]. 
 28. Alabama’s formulation is neither really contractualist nor fully status-oriented.  For 
that reason, it is both creative and hard to know what to make of it.  For some criticism of 
moving more in the contractualist direction, see Mary Lyndon Shanley, Just Marriage:  On 
the Public Importance of Private Unions, in JUST MARRIAGE 3, 5–6 (Joshua Cohen & 
Deborah Chasman eds., 2004). 
 29. Ala. S.B. 377 § 1(a). 
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version of the institution that may have been closer to France’s treatment of 
marriage at the state level, which keeps the name “marriage” but in a 
wholly secularized form.30 
This might not go far enough for some progressives who would prefer a 
greater disestablishment, of course.31  But to the extent that the state was 
merely looking to withdraw from sanctifying marriages itself, allowing 
parties to contract in a civil process for state recognition, the proposed 
Alabama regime was at least a step toward disentanglement without any 
explicit power delegated to the private religious sphere.  Implicitly, the new 
regime would permit religious institutions to exclude same-sex couples 
from their version of marriage.  But the civil marriage category would be 
open to all couples wishing to sign a civil contract. 
Yet even for those who wish for greater disestablishment nationwide, 
Alabama’s proposed approach might be better than a full withdrawal from 
marriage altogether.  To wit, if Alabama “withdrew from the marrying 
business, leaving the expressive domain to religions and to other private 
groups, and offering [only] civil unions to both same- and opposite-sex 
couples,”32 it would leave all Alabama couples in a purgatory from the 
standpoint of federal law, which relies on “marriage” as the relevant status 
for the conferral of federal benefits.  So from the standpoint of continuity 
and coherence with the federal regime, Alabama’s approach is a decent 
interim position in a direction that provides advantages for both religious 
and progressive communities that want the state to be in a different 
relationship with marriage. 
Perhaps progressives could even convince Alabama’s legislative houses 
to provide for both contracts of marriage and contracts of civil unions or 
domestic partnership (available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples), 
deeming both contracts to have identical benefits and burdens statewide.  
Whether the state could deem a civil union within the state to get the 
marital package at the federal level is trickier—and it may take federal 
legislative action to accomplish that objective of putting a wider menu of 
relational arrangements on equal footing.  But at the least giving couples 
more choices about what to call their coupling to the state—whether same-
sex or opposite-sex—is something that should be acceptable to both 
 
 30. See Andrew C. Stevens, By the Power Vested in Me?  Licensing Religious Officials 
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camps.33  Such an approach could also provide the benefit of not effectively 
compelling people to get married;34 after marriage equality, many 
companies and insurers are shedding benefits for “significant others” when 
that other is not a spouse, and that is shoving private ordering into a 
compulsory marriage regime.35  This is a troubling development just at the 
time the state may be able to distance itself from moralistic marriage. 
Oklahoma’s efforts were more troubling than Alabama’s.  On the surface, 
Oklahoma’s House Bill 112536 also proposed to do away with marriage 
licenses issued by the state—without quite disbanding the status of 
marriage.  The state was proposing to “record” marriages without 
sanctifying or solemnizing them itself.  But its regime did not go as far 
toward secularizing marriage as Alabama’s Senate proposed.  Although the 
bill referred to marriages being “contracted” in disparate provisions, the 
Oklahoma bill is substantially less contractarian than Alabama’s. 
To be sure, the Oklahoma House proposed to strike from its family law—
before Obergefell—the rules limiting marriage to “person[s] of the opposite 
sex.”37  But in the list of people that may perform or solemnize marriages, 
 
 33. When the Dutch government decided to offer “registered partnerships” along with 
marriage to both opposite- and same-sex couples, many opposite-sex couples wanted the 
marriage-like institution “devoid of the symbolism attached to marriage.” Kees Waaldijk, 
Small Change:  How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in 
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:  A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 457–58 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001) 
(ebook).  As most states in the United States that have created “civil unions” or “domestic 
partnerships” before marriage equality offered the option mostly to same-sex couples (and 
only to opposite-sex couples rarely or on a restricted basis), see generally Case, supra note 6, 
at 1774–76, it has not been easy to tell what the demand for such an option might be more 
generally. 
 34. Consider Katherine Franke’s video reflection on Obergefell. See Catrin Einhorn, 
How We Changed Our Thinking on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/26/us/changed-thinking-on-gay-marriage.html 
(explaining that all the gay couples in Franke’s social circle who were once critical of 
marriage are now marrying because their lawyers and accountants are telling them they are 
crazy not to) [http://perma.cc/7UCF-UYDG].  Although Janet Halley already in 2006 
highlighted the way we are all compelled to “[c]arry[] a [b]rief for” marriage, JANET 
HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS:  HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 17 (2006), 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell is a very clear version of that brief, now 
announced as the supreme law of the United States. 
 35. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Fate of Domestic Partner Benefits in Question After 
Marriage Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/your-
money/fate-of-domestic-partner-benefits-in-question-after-marriage-ruling.html 
[http://perma.cc/X3SL-PZLR]; Laura Lorenzetti, Looking to Stay on Your Partner’s 
Insurance?  It May Be Time to Get Married, TIME (June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3938225/ 
same-sex-benefits-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/9UMA-XHWW]. 
 36. H.R. 1125, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015), https://legiscan.com/OK/text/HB1125/ 
2015 [http://perma.cc/DAX3-3G3K]. 
 37. The red-lined proposed changes to Oklahoma’s family law are available online. See 
id.  Same-sex marriage has been available in Oklahoma since 2014, Bishop v. Smith, 760 
F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), so the small change here in state legislation was already 
effectively required by the federal courts.  But it was still a recognition that state laws on the 
books should change through legislation, not just through decrees of federal courts.  James 
Brudney and I are starting to develop an account of when it makes sense for legislatures to 
undertake “legislative underwrites” when they want to adopt, through the democratic 
process, ends that have already been won through the judicial process. 
2015] HAIL MARRIAGE AND FAREWELL 51 
Oklahoma purported to include not only “at least two adult, competent 
persons as witnesses” and “a judge or retired judge of any court” in 
Oklahoma, but also “an ordained or authorized preacher or minister of the 
Gospel, priest or other ecclesiastical dignitary of any denomination who has 
been duly ordained or authorized by the church to which he or she belongs 
to preach the Gospel, or a rabbi.”38  In a way, this privatizes marriage, 
enabling parties to get married by friends, a judicial official, or a religious 
institution.  But the approach does not cleanly secularize marriage, and puts 
religious (exclusionary) marriage on the same footing as judicial (equal 
access) marriages:  they all get recorded as legitimate marriages by the 
state.  Unlike Germany and France, where the state is clear that civil 
marriage is the only legally relevant category (and religious marriages have 
no public legal validity),39 Oklahoma’s regime elevates the religious 
marriage and records it as legitimate within the state on par with a marriage 
before a judge.  More, Oklahoma’s proposed regime would continue to 
require a ceremony, reinforcing the bourgeois nature of the institution.40 
In short, although Oklahoma’s modest effort to privatize marriage by 
ceasing to issue “licenses” was a “baby step” toward disestablishment (if it 
can even be called that), there is little in the rough draft of the bill as it 
stands to garner much support from the marriage-skeptics in the LGBT 
community.  Oklahoma’s approach would tend to reinforce the religious 
and bourgeois character of the institution.  Yet it may be possible to 
convince the State House and/or Senate in the future to craft a better regime 
that protects both the freedom of religion and the freedom from marriage, 
especially a too-religious and bourgeois version of it.  Some evidence that 
these issues are not purely partisan and that common ground might be 
found can be gleaned by studying the roll call votes in Oklahoma on House 
Bill 1125:  Republicans and Democrats do not seem to have settled on a 
clear position about the way forward in this area.41  Deliberation may 
continue and actually produce progress for all. 
 
*     *     * 
 
Marriage-skeptics largely failed to predict that a successful marriage 
equality movement, culminating in a favorable decision from the Supreme 
Court, could get them somewhat closer to their goals by hitching a ride with 
some of the resistors to integrating the institution of marriage.  Even Justice 
Kennedy’s over-the-top preaching about the virtues of marriage comes shy 
of actually compelling states to offer marriage from a constitutional 
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perspective.  But from a social perspective, marriage equality’s success 
might make marriage seem almost compulsory for couples—and the LGBT 
marriage-skeptics were probably right that this can serve to denigrate 
people who do not couple in the one way the state recognizes in the United 
States.  Ultimately, those marriage-skeptics may have to hold their noses 
when they see who it is that can help them disestablish marriage from the 
state.  But in the marriage debate as elsewhere, politics makes strange 
bedfellows.  There is work to be done, and the Right and the Left might be 
able to coordinate and collaborate on the future of marriage, now that there 
is no question about the equal public rights of same-sex couples to marriage 
if the state offers it. 
 
